A Practitioner Survey Exploring the Value of Forensic Tools, AI, Filtering, & Safer Presentation for Investigating Child Sexual Abuse Material by Sanchez, Laura et al.
University of New Haven
Digital Commons @ New Haven
Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science Faculty Publications
Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science
2019
A Practitioner Survey Exploring the Value of
Forensic Tools, AI, Filtering, & Safer Presentation
for Investigating Child Sexual Abuse Material
Laura Sanchez
University of New Haven
Cinthya Grajeda
University of New Haven
Ibrahim Baggili
University of New Haven, ibaggili@newhaven.edu
Cory Hall
The MITRE Corporation
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/
electricalcomputerengineering-facpubs
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons,
Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security Commons
Comments
Dr. Baggili was appointed to the University of New Haven's Elder Family Endowed Chair in 2015,
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Publisher Citation
Sanchez, L., Grajeda, C., Baggili, I., & Hall, C. (2019). A Practitioner Survey Exploring the Value of Forensic Tools, AI, Filtering, &
Safer Presentation for Investigating Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). Digital Investigation, 29, S124-S142.
DFRWS 2019 USA d Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual DFRWS USA
A Practitioner Survey Exploring the Value of Forensic Tools, AI,
Filtering, & Safer Presentation for Investigating Child Sexual Abuse
Material (CSAM)
Laura Sanchez a, Cinthya Grajeda a, Ibrahim Baggili a, *, Cory Hall b
a Cyber Forensics Research and Education Group (UNHcFREG Tagliatela College of Engineering, ECECS, University of New Haven, 300 Boston Post Rd., West
Haven, CT, 06516, USA
b The MITRE Corporation, 7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA, 22102-7539, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Keywords:
Digital forensics
Data science
Artificial intelligence
Digital forensic tools
Investigations
Child sexual assault
Child sexual abuse material
Law enforcement
Safer presentation
a b s t r a c t
For those investigating cases of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), there is the potential harm of
experiencing trauma after illicit content exposure over a period of time. Research has shown that those
working on such cases can experience psychological distress. As a result, there has been a greater effort
to create and implement technologies that reduce exposure to CSAM. However, not much work has
explored gathering insight regarding the functionality, effectiveness, accuracy, and importance of digital
forensic tools and data science technologies from practitioners who use them. This study focused spe-
cifically on examining the value practitioners give to the tools and technologies they utilize to investigate
CSAM cases. General findings indicated that implementing filtering technologies is more important than
safe-viewing technologies; false positives are a greater concern than false negatives; resources such as
time, personnel, and money continue to be a concern; and an improved workflow is highly desirable.
Results also showed that practitioners are not well-versed in data science and Artificial Intelligence (AI),
which is alarming given that tools already implement these techniques and that practitioners face large
amounts of data during investigations. Finally, the data exemplified that practitioners are generally not
taking advantage of tools that implement data science techniques, and that the biggest need for them is
in automated child nudity detection, age estimation and skin tone detection.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The increased use of mobile technologies and the willingness of
general society to capture and share even the most intimate details
of their lives has created an abundant source of evidence for in-
vestigators. In particular, digital images and videos have become a
substantial component in the investigation of child sexual abuse
material (CSAM). Whether serving as direct or circumstantial evi-
dence, images and videos can provide significant details, such as
the identity of victims and suspects.
While beneficial to an investigation, the sheer amount of digital
content encountered and handled by investigators is problematic.
Individual investigations may deal with terabytes of data, con-
taining millions of still images and hundreds of hours of video,
across multiple devices (Quick and Choo, 2014). Examining such
large volumes for relevant evidence may be a long, unmanageable,
and unproductive process. This is true even with the use of auto-
mated digital forensic tools, which struggle to keep up with the
constant evolution of devices and to rapidly process large datasets.
Consequently, this can lead to lost time during urgent cases and an
increase in backlogs (Vidas et al., 2014).
In addition to putting a strain on organizational resources, the
processing and examination of CSAM can be traumatic for in-
vestigators. Exposure to such imagery may elicit symptoms similar
to those of post-traumatic stress disorder. Investigators may
experience physical and emotional impact on self and home,
intrusive images and thoughts about the viewed content, and a
heightened protectiveness or paranoia regarding the safety of
children (Burns et al., 2008).
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A growing amount of research has been conducted on the
impact of working on CSAM cases (Burns et al., 2008; Krause, 2009;
Perez et al., 2010; Bourke and Craun, 2013; Seigfried-Spellar, 2017)
and specific work-related challenges (Franqueira et al., 2018).
However, research has not concentrated on the specific role of the
technologies and tools utilized by investigators in these cases. In
particular, there has not been a comprehensive study examining
the value investigators give to these tools and technologies. While
usability studies focusing on the appearance, ease of use, and data
presentation of forensic tools have been conducted (Hibshi et al.,
2011; Bennett and Stephens, 2008), there are a lack of studies
focusing specifically on the role and value of tools and technologies
currently available to those investigating CSAM cases.
Our study presents survey findings aimed at gathering the
insight of child exploitation investigators regarding the function-
ality, effectiveness, accuracy, and importance of the tools and
technologies they use. The motivation is to gain an understanding
of how investigators utilize and view tools and technologies in
order to improve workflow, shorten the amount of time of an
investigation, and limit investigative exposure to CSAM content.
Results will inform current research and development projects to
improve or establish new products or processes for investigating
CSAM. Our contributions are as follows:
 This is the first comprehensive survey study to explore the value
assigned by practitioners to current tools utilized in the inves-
tigation of CSAM.
 This is the first comprehensive survey to study the current use of
Data Science techniques and technologies in the investigation of
CSAM.
 This study explores and identifies what investigators deem as
acceptable false positive and false negative rates of CSAM
investigative technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents back-
ground information and related work. Next, Section 3 details the
methodology employed in the study. The survey design is discussed
in Section 4, followed by a presentation of the results in Section 5.
Limitations of the study are discussed in Section 6, and Section 7
recaps the main findings and areas of future work. Finally, recom-
mendations are made in Section 8 while Section 9 concludes the
paper by acknowledging those that have contributed to the study.
2. Related work
2.1. Psychological aspect/trauma
Investigating the potential emotional impact of exposure to
CSAM, Burns et al. (2008) points out that those working on Internet
Child Exploitation (ICE) teams are at risk for developing secondary
traumatic stress, caused by having knowledge of or helping those in
traumatic situations. Powell et al. (2015) further investigated the
impact of CSAM on ICE investigators via in-depth interviews asking
participants to discuss their subjective experience of viewing ma-
terial that evoked a negative reaction. Their results indicated that
perceptions vary, with some participants considering themselves
“secondary victims” while most feel that their work was not any
riskier than other types of policing. Overall, participants indicated
having short-term emotional and physical reactions.
Secondary traumatic stress and coping mechanisms are also
explored by Bourke and Craun (2013) in their large-scale study of
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) personnel. However, in
their study, for the ðn ¼ 600Þ participants who completed survey
responses, the severity of secondary traumatic stress was calcu-
lated. The results indicated that about one quarter of the
respondents faced significant secondary traumatic stress, while
more than one half scored in the lower to mild range (Bourke and
Craun, 2013). Those with higher levels of secondary traumatic
stress reported more difficulty and engagement with explicit con-
tent, indicating a correlation between difficulty and stress.
Subsequently, Seigfried-Spellar (2017) surveyed ðn ¼ 129Þ law
enforcement officers from ICAC's listserv. Results showed that
personnel who had to perform both the duties of an investigator
and digital forensic examiner in CSAM cases were the most affected
in experiencing secondary traumatic stress, low self-worth, and
lack of concentration when compared to personnel who only
worked as a digital forensic examiner.
2.2. Tools, techniques, and automation
Recent studies indicate that supportive work environments play
an important role in coping strategies for CSAM investigators
(Burns et al., 2008; Bourke and Craun, 2013). Further analysis
concentrating on investigators’ perceived challenges in the field
demonstrate that technology is an essential component in devel-
oping and maintaining a supportive environment, particularly in
the form of increasing efficiency and reducing workloads. Partici-
pants in a study by Powell et al. (2014), for example, discussed the
strain of large workloads and long hours and indicated that com-
puter technology is an asset in this regard.
Recognizing the importance of technology in such in-
vestigations, a few researchers have proposed or introduced new
technologies and tools for detecting and processing CSAM. Among
them is Sae-Bae et al. (2014), who proposed a method to auto-
matically detect CSAM. Improving on skin tone and face detection,
the proposed system intended to identify explicit images and
detect children's faces in such images.
Ulges and Stahl (2011) introduced a system of CSAM detection
based on color visual words. The system analyzes small color
patches of an image and provides classifications (CSAM v. non-
CSAM) with the assistance of a Support Vector Machine (SVM).
To assist investigators at a crime scene, de Castro Polastro and da
Silva Eleuterio (2010) presented the NuDetective Forensic Tool. The
tool was intended to automatically filter files and quickly detect
CSAM so investigators may analyze files on the spot. To accomplish
this, the tool detects nudity via image pixel analysis.
2.3. Triaging
Regardless of the lack of official definition of triaging, much
work has been done in an effort to improve the process. For
instance, Rogers et al. (2006) introduced The Cyber Forensic Field
Triage ProcessModel (CFFTPM), where the goal is to rapidly process
forensic evidence on the field using a six-phase forensic processing
model. The phases include “planning, triage, usage/user profiles,
chronology/timeline, Internet activity, and case specific evidence.”
Another approach was developed by Shaw and Browne (2013),
called “enhanced previewing.” As an automated process, all located
devices are processed, but only those with evidence are forensically
examined (Shaw and Browne, 2013). Although the approach en-
ables practitioners to process more evidence, it has its limitations,
including not being suitable for field work and complicating case
management.
Utilizing Machine Learning (ML), Marturana and Tacconi (2013)
proposed a triaging methodology automating the categorization of
digital media. To be used in both “live” and “dead” forensic in-
vestigations, the process analyzes devices and, based on a series of
quantitative measures, or evidence, assigns a class and associates
the device with a type of crime.
Finally, Baggili et al. (2014) developed a triage tool called
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Forensics2020. This tool implemented a five phase, multi-threaded
bootable technique. Investigators do not have to wait until all
phases are finalized; rather, they are able to examine any evidence
that has been processed in a completed phase.
2.4. Artificial Intelligence (AI)
As the capabilities of AI continue to expand, researchers have
begun utilizing ML to develop tools for quickly detecting and
identifying CSAM. Among these tools is the iCOP toolkit, introduced
by Peersman et al. (2016). The toolkit, intended for peer-to-peer
networks (P2P), utilizes two modules, filename categorization
and media classification, to identify and flag new CSAM (Peersman
et al., 2016). Furthermore, the tool also allows investigators to see
who has shared known CSAM (based on generated hash values) and
what other content has been shared by the client (Peersman et al.,
2016).
Utilizing Caffe,1 Yahoo has also developed a model called Not
Safe for Work (NSFW) to detect pornographic images. The tool
works by taking an image as input and providing a probability
score, “which can be used to detect and filter NSFW images”
(Mahadeokar and Pesavento, 2016). Similarly, Microsoft offers a
technology called PhotoDNA2 to detect and report CSAM. This tool,
however, is typical in that it detects CSAM based on hash values,
comparing the value to that of known child explicit content
(PhotoDNA Cloud Service, n.d.).
Focusing on shaping Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), Vitorino et al. (2018) used data-driven concepts to effec-
tively automate detection of CSAM and other related content using
a training dataset composed of thousands of images gathered from
the Brazilian Federal Police. Anda et al. (2018), on the other hand,
concentrated their efforts on evaluating established age prediction
services, such as Amazon Rekognition,3 Deep Expectation (DEX),4
Kairos,5 and Microsoft Azure Cognitive.6 The goal was to identify
any performance related issues and trends among different services
to improve overall results. One major issue hindering the
advancement of these types of technologies is the lack of properly
labeled age range databases. Thus, the researchers created a dataset
generator in order to efficiently evaluate these services.
3. Methodology
The following methodology was employed to conduct this
research:
1. Performed a literature review, obtaining and examining previ-
ous, related work. The findings are discussed in Section 2.
2 Designed and piloted the survey utilizing Qualtrics7 survey
software.
3 Obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at
the University of New Haven (UNH)8 to collect data.
4. Distributed the survey to several agencies and organizations via
the MITRE Corporation.9
5. Obtained data by exporting recorded responses as PDF and CSV
files and raw data from Qualtrics.
6. Data was analyzed by the researchers, each tackling a different
focal point or section of the survey.
4. Survey design
The questions were designed to address a particular need in the
field and in research: understanding what tools and technologies
are utilized by CSAM investigators and how they feel about these
tools and technologies. Design of the survey commenced January
2018 and, following three drafts and two brief testing phases, the
surveywas distributed April 2018. Any revisionsmade to the survey
were to address issues of wording and formatting.
The survey consisted of 49 questions of the following question
types: 7 Likert Scale,11Multiple Choice, 7 Multiple Selection, 6 Free
Response, 2 Rank, 1 Drop Down List, and 15 Numerical Slider.
Furthermore, the survey contained a page of definitions explaining
the technologies that would be explored in many of the questions.
As the survey was intended to gauge an understanding of the
tool and technology usage experiences of CSAM investigators, it
was distributed to various types of agencies that have concentrated
their efforts on this type of work. Agencies ranged from state to
local, public to private, and national to international to provide a
diverse and global perspective.
5. Results
The survey was distributed through Qualtrics and remained
open for about two months. The ideal population sample size was
calculated to be ðn ¼ 97Þ participants10. One hundred and nineteen
participants were recorded to have accessed the survey, and out of
those, 118 consented to take the survey, one did not consent, and 12
did not submit any responses at all. Not all ðn ¼ 106Þ participants
answered every question in the survey. This discrepancy is
addressed in every section and discussed in the Limitations section
(Section 6) of the paper.
This section presents the following results: Section 5.1 De-
mographics, 5.2 Tools, 5.3 Technology, 5.4 Workflow, and 5.5
Acquisition, Processing, Analysis, & Reporting Time.
5.1. Demographics
Results relating to demographics (Appendix A; Table A.1), show
that the majority of the sample population were white (93.40%)
males ranging from ages 35e54 (65.10%) with at least a high school
diploma. The majority (41.51%) of respondents indicated a Bache-
lor's degree as their highest level of education and most degrees
were related to the fields of technology and law (Appendix A;
Table A.2). In fact, more respondents have a degree in Crime, Law,
and Justice (28.41%) than in Digital Forensics (17.05%). It should be
kept in mind however, that only 83.02% (88 of 106) of the total
number of participants responded to this question.
When asked about competency (Appendix A; Fig. 4) in areas
such as Computer Science and Data Science, for example, 94.34% of
respondents (100 of 106) provided an answer. Results indicate that
respondents agree and strongly agree in being most competent in
Digital Forensics (99%), Internet and Information technology (79%)
and Computer Science (75%), while the majority (41%) neither
agrees nor disagrees on being competent in Data Science. Further-
more, participants were the least competent in Software Engi-
neering and Software Design.
1 https://github.com/yahoo/open/nsfw.
2 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna.
3 https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/.
4 https://data.vision.ee.ethz.ch/cvl/rrothe/imdb-wiki/.
5 http://kairos.com/.
6 https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services.
7 https://www.qualtrics.com.
8 https://www.newhaven.edu.
9 https://www.mitre.org.
10 Calculations were made using a 95% confidence level, 0.50 standard deviation
and a margin of error (confidence interval) of ± 10%
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When asked about their employment category (Appendix A;
Table A.1), 94.34% (100 of 106) of participants answered the ques-
tion. A majority currently work at a local (46%) and state govern-
ment level (32%), with their major occupation being that of a digital
forensic examiner (69.92%) and Investigator (26.32%). It is impor-
tant to note, that based on the high number of responses to this
question (133), some respondents can be identified as having both
occupations or more. Additionally, when asked about years of
experience (Appendix A; Table A.1), 94.34% (100 of 106) of partic-
ipants responded. Results show that 5% have less than one year
experience working in CSAM investigations, while the majority
have more than six years of experience (63%) in the field.
Lastly, 94.34% (100 of 106) of participants answered the question
whether they received formal training to investigate CSAM cases.
Most respondents (69%) indicated having received formal training
while the remaining respondents indicated not having received any
training at all. Appendix A, Tables A.3 and A.4 present the training
locations provided by respondents. The results are widely spread
out, totaling 176 responses, with respondents indicating receiving
training from multiple sources. Most of the respondents received
training through government funded programs (28.41%), such as
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) and National White Collar
Crime Center (NW3C), and commercial forensic tool companies
(14.20%), such as Guidance Software/EnCase and AccessData.
5.2. Tools
5.2.1. Processing
Participants were asked a series of questions regarding the tools
they currently utilize when investigating CSAM cases. Two ques-
tions, presented in a multiple-answer format, asked participants to
identify all the tools they use to process CSAM images and videos.
The questions were posed separately to garner an understanding of
whether practitioners are utilizing similar or distinct tools to pro-
cess both images and videos. Both questions were answered by
ðn ¼ 99Þ of the 106 survey participants (93%), however, when asked
about image processing tools, a total of 536 responses were pro-
vided, whereas 441 were provided for video imaging tools.
Only one respondent indicated not using tools to process CSAM
images, while the rest indicated using at least one or more tools. As
seen in Appendix B, Table B.5, the top three tools selected were
Cellebrite UFED/PA (17%), Magnet Forensics IEF/Axiom (16%), and
Forensic Toolkit (12%). In regards to video processing, two re-
spondents indicated not using tools, while the rest indicated using
at least one tool or more. As shown in Appendix B, Table B.6, the top
three tools selected were Magnet Forensics/Axiom (18%), Cellebrite
UFED/PA (17%), and Forensic Toolkit (13%). Unsurprisingly, for both
questions the results indicated that commercial tools appear to be
utilized more than free or open-source tools.
Additionally, participants were asked to provide feedback
regarding limitations of the tools they currently use to investigate
CSAM cases. The results from this free response question are dis-
played in Table B.7 of Appendix B. Of the ðn ¼ 106Þ participants, 41
(39%) responded to the question. Of those that responded, three
(7%) indicated that there were no limitations, while six (15%) did
not provide details of the limitations. As Table B.7 illustrates, most
respondents indicated having encountered feature/capability
related limitations (62%), such as their tool lacking certain filtering
or safe-viewing technologies and the ability to carve images,
enhance poor quality photos, or automatically group together
several images of the same victim, among other things. Time and
speed were identified as the top limitation for the features/capa-
bilities category, as well as overall. The provided feedback indicates
that respondents are also encountering limitations related to ac-
curacy and user-friendliness.
5.2.2. Detection
To understand if practitioners are taking advantage of currently
available tools implementing AI and ML to automatically detect
pornographic content, specifically Yahoo NSFWand iCOP/ICAC COP,
participants were asked about their usage of such tools. Of survey
participants, 73.58% responded to the question. As seen in
Appendix B, Table B.8, 50% indicated that they have used or
currently use iCOP/iCAC COP, 2.56% indicated they have used or
currently use Yahoo NSFW and 1.28% indicated they have used or
currently use both. The remaining respondents (46.15%) indicated
that they have not used either of the tools.
Participants were also asked about the benefits and limitations
of such tools, the results of which are displayed in Appendix B,
Table B.8. Regarding the benefits of using such tools, 39.62% of the
participants provided feedback. Quickness was identified as the
top benefit (22.92%), with many explaining that these tools cut
down on processing time, help prioritize sooner, and encourage
faster resolution of investigations. This contrasts the feedback
provided about the image and video processing tools, where
speed was seen as a limitation (e.g. the tools process too slowly).
As for limitations, 36.79% of participants provided feedback. The
ability of the tool to identify only known or hashed content was
listed as the top limitation (25%). Interestingly, this ability was
also recognized by several as being the reason why the tools work
quickly. This means that investigators need technologies that are
capable of filtering known media without relying on their hash
values.
5.3. Technology
5.3.1. Implementation and usage
Participants were provided multiple-answer questions to iden-
tify filtering and safe-viewing technologies employed by the tools
they use to process CSAM images and videos. The questions were
asked separately to determine if image and video processing tools
are implementing the same technologies. There was not much
variance among the number of respondents or the responses
themselves. While 94 (87%) participants provided a response
regarding the technologies found in their image processing tools,
97 (92%) provided a response regarding the technologies found in
their video processing tools. For both tool types, 13 respondents
indicated that none of the listed technologies were implemented by
their tool. Results are displayed in Table C.9, Appendix C.
Skin tone detection, a filtering technology, was found to
comprise 56% of the responses for both tool types. Both tool types
were indicated to be lacking pose estimation, least explicit frame,
selective body part viewing, and neural net detection tag presen-
tation technologies. Among the other types of technologies, many
had identical results while a small difference existed between a
few. These distinct similarities and small differences indicate that,
among respondents, image and video processing tools are imple-
menting the same technologies.
Table C.9 also shows the results of two multiple-answer ques-
tions asking participants to specify which of the available filtering
and safe-viewing technologies they actually use to process CSAM.
Ninety-four (90%) participants provided a response indicating
which technologies they use to process images and 93 (89%) indi-
cated which technologies they use to process videos. Unsurpris-
ingly, skin tone detection was found to be the most utilized
technology for processing both images (52%) and videos (46%). Age
and gender estimation, both filtering technologies, were found to
be the least utilized, while pose estimation, least explicit frame,
selective body part viewing, and neural net detection tag presen-
tation were not utilized at all. As anticipated, safe-viewing tech-
nologies appeared to be the least utilized, particularly as they also
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appeared to be implemented by tools much less than filtering
technologies.
5.3.2. Value, ranking, and preference
A series of value questions regarding filtering and safe-viewing
technologies was also given to participants. Two questions specif-
ically asked how valuable the implementation of a particular type
of technology would be in an image or video processing tool. The
results are shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
Close to 70% of participants (68.87%) provided feedback
regarding the value of certain technologies for image processing
tools. Of those that responded, over half (54.79%) indicated that
implementation of child nudity detection would be very valuable,
followed by age estimation (46.58%) and skin tone detection
(36.99%). Overall, for most of the filtering technologies, such as
child nudity detection, implementation was seen as being valuable
or very valuable, with the exception of three (gender estimation,
pose estimation, and object detection), which were deemed slightly
or moderately valuable.
The implementation of safe-viewing technologies, such as se-
lective body part viewing, on the other hand, was viewed as pre-
dominately slightly to moderately valuable. Of the safe-viewing
technologies, implementation of selective body part viewing was
chosen by the highest percentage of respondents (17.81%) as being
very valuable, followed by neural net detection tag presentation
(16.44%) and nudity blocking (13.70%).
When asked about the value of implementing certain technol-
ogies in video processing tools, 67.92% of participants responded.
The implementation of both child nudity detection and age esti-
mation were rated as very valuable by over half of the respondents
(51.39% each), followed by skin tone detection (43.06%). Similar to
filtering technologies for image processing tools, the implementa-
tion of filtering technologies for video processing tools was
generally viewed as being valuable or very valuable. As for the safe-
viewing technologies, implementation of each was chiefly viewed
as being moderately valuable, with implementation of neural net
detection tag presentation being viewed as very valuable by the
highest percentage of respondents (20.83%).
In general, the results indicate that respondents assigned a
higher value to the implementation of filtering technologies than
safe-viewing technologies for both image and video processing
tools. These results may be due in part to participants not being
aware of these technologies as their tools do not implement them.
While the value of implementing safe-viewing technologies was
generally viewed as slightly to moderately valuable, when posed
with a value question focusing on the usage of these technologies,
respondents indicated that usage was, overall, moderately valuable
to valuable. This may signify that although the implementation of
these technologies by processing tools may not be as important, if
available, their usage can be beneficial in an investigation.
Receiving the highest percentage of very valuable scores were the
face presentation and nudity blocker technologies (18.31% each).
Incidentally, the nudity blocker technology also received among the
highest not valuable scores (15.49%), after selective body part
viewing (16.90%). Results are displayed below in Fig. 3.
In addition to determining the value of filtering technologies,
participants were asked to rank each technology in order of
importance, with one being themost important and eight being the
least. The previous value questions turned out to be indicative of
how each filtering technology would be ranked. Overall, each of the
filtering technologies was ranked according to the very valuable
score it received, with those focusing on video processing tools
being the most accurate. As expected, child nudity detection was
ranked as most important by respondents (47.89%) and object
detection as least important (64.79%). Figure C.5 in Appendix C il-
lustrates the results.
Surprisingly, the opposite was found to be true when ranking
safe-viewing technologies. In the image and video processing tools
value questions, selective body part viewing and neural net
detection tag presentation received the highest very valuable
scores, but ended up being ranked among the least important,
whereas least explicit frame and face presentation received the
lowest very valuable scores and ranked among the most important.
In comparison, however, the ranking results were closer to the
results of the value question pertaining to the usage of safe-viewing
technology. The results can be seen in Figure C.6 in Appendix C.
Fig. 1. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
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Participants were also asked a value question regarding tech-
nology that could identify certain age groups. The results are shown
in C.7 in Appendix C. The age group 0 months to 12 years received
the highest percentage of very valuable ratings (71.62%), followed
by three to five years and five to twelve years (68.92% each).
As it had been anticipated that the age range of 0 monthse12
years would likely receive the highest percentage of very valuable
ratings, a follow-up value question for this age rangewas asked. The
question asked how valuable it would be to have a technology that
could identify children between the ages of 0 months and 12 years.
As seen in C.8, Appendix C, the majority of respondents (67.57%)
selected the rating very valuable. As expected, this percentage is
very close to that of the previous question, confirming that a
technology that can identify a broader range of ages is more
desirable.
One-way ANOVA tests were conducted to determine if mean
Fig. 2. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer section.
Fig. 3. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
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differences existed between certain groups when assigning value to
video and image processing technology, safe-viewing filtering
technology, and technology for identifying specific age groups.
Here, groups were categorized according to employment type and
time on job. Results indicated that a statistically significant differ-
ence exists among group means when analyzing time on job
against value of video and image processing technology (F ¼ 4.349,
p ¼ .003) and safe-viewing filtering technology (F ¼ 4.510,
p ¼ .003). When measured against technology for identifying
specific age groups, only employment type showed a mean differ-
ence between groups (F ¼ 2.527, p ¼ .037). This does not indicate a
relationship or correlation between particular value questions and
employment type or time on job but, simply, that a mean difference
exists and it may be interesting to explore in future work.
5.3.3. False positives/negatives
Due in part to the concern practitioners have expressed
regarding false positives and negatives, participants were asked a
series of questions regarding this topic. The questions focused on
the expected rate and optimal rate of false positives and negatives.
This was conducted to determine what rate of false results partic-
ipants expect to get (based on their previous experience) when
utilizing a filtering or safe-viewing technology and what rate of
false results they would realistically like to see.
Four questions were posed, with each asking participants to
provide a percentage rating to 13 filtering and safe-viewing tech-
nologies, indicating what rate of false positives and negatives they
would expect and desire for each. The questions were answered by
50%e65% of the participants, each question being answered by a
different number of people. It should be noted that in order to
obtain amore accurate picture of the results, calculations have been
achieved with the exclusion of outliers, given that some partici-
pants simply chose zero as a number for answers when using a
slider.
Table C.10 in Appendix C shows the results of the expected and
optimal false positive rates, respectively. Of the number of partic-
ipants, 65.10% provided a response regarding the expected rate of
false positives and 53.77% provided a response regarding the
optimal rate of false positives. As anticipated, the optimal rates
were lower than those of the expected rates, indicating that, ideally,
respondents would like to see a lower number of false positives. For
example, age estimation, which saw the biggest change, had a
mean of 27.84 and a median of 25.75 for expected false positives
(SD ¼ 14.74). When the optimal time for false positives of age
estimation was considered, the mean dropped to 14.47, a 13.37
difference, and the median dropped to 10.45, a 15.3 difference.
Additionally, the standard deviation dropped to 13.20, 1.27 points
from the mean.
Overall, this type of change was across the board, with the
exception of face detection, face recognition, and face presentation,
all of which experienced an increase in standard deviation. How-
ever, although the standard deviation increased among these
technologies, the number of points between the mean and stan-
dard deviation dropped. When grouping together the technologies,
the mean of expected false positives fell from 268.80 to 182.60 for
optimal false positives.
The results for the expected and optimal rate of false negatives
are shown in Table C.11 in Appendix C. Similar to the questions
about false positives, a larger amount of participants answered the
question regarding the expected rate of false negatives (61.32%)
than the question regarding the optimal rate of false negatives
(50%). As expected, the optimal rates were also lower than the
expected rates. For example, age estimation, which, again, experi-
enced the greatest amount of change, had a mean of 23.00 and a
median of 20.5 for expected false negatives SD ¼ 14.86. For optimal
rate of false negatives these numbers dropped. The optimal rate
saw a mean of 11.17, an 11.83 difference, and a median of 6.7, a 13.8
difference. Additionally, the standard deviation dropped to 11.12,
putting it at .05 points from the mean.
All of the technologies listed experienced this trend, except for
pose estimation and object detection, whose standard deviation
increased. However, while their standard deviation increased, the
number of points between the mean and standard deviation
dropped. When grouped together, the mean of expected false
negatives for these technologies was 251.04 and fell to 145.10 when
considering optimal false negatives.
5.4. Workflow
This section discusses results pertaining to the limitations, and
possible improvement, of workflows. Table D.12 in Appendix D
presents results on the limitations participants have encountered
with their current workflow when investigating CSAM. Out of 106
survey participants, 66.04% provided input for this question. Of that
percentage, only 65.71% provided useful feedback on their limita-
tions and 25.71% claimed they did not have any limitations, while
8.58% submitted invalid data or the question was not applicable to
them.
Results indicate that participants have limitations in their
workflow across the board, with the majority pertaining to current
tools and technology (28.77%). For instance, respondents are
limited by the lack of filtering mechanisms to identify images,
videos, and unrelated artifacts with their current tools. Hash
filtering technologies, such as one from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST),11 are another problem because
they are limited to filtering through known CSAM.
Participants also encountered limitations in their workload
(20.55%), time (17.81%), and resources (10.96%). For example, the
vast amount of data and devices to process, along with large
caseloads, adds to the workload. Additionally, the lack of in-
vestigators, time, and advanced hardware and tools, to process and
analyze data continuously increases backlogs.
The next question focused on the improvements participants
would like to see in their current workflow. The same number of
people that answered the previous question, provided a response
(66.04%). Of this percentage, 84.28% suggested improvements to
their current workflow, 4.29% did not have any suggestions, while
11.43% were not sure, submitted invalid data or found the question
inapplicable to them.
Table D.13 in Appendix D illustrates results gathered from 83
suggestions. Most participants indicated needing more resources
(36.14%) and better tools and technology (33.73%). For instance,
employing more analysts/investigators would help ease the work-
load.Respondents also indicated that tools and technologies could
be improved by adding efficient filtering mechanisms for identi-
fying images, videos, and unrelated artifacts, along with more
filtering options and task automation. Other suggestions include
adding more CSAM hash databases and making it feasible for in-
vestigators nationwide to share hash values of such content;
providing more training for management; and implementation of
more realistic policies and standards that reflect the current
workflow.
On the next question, participants were given the opportunity to
rate the value of and suggest any enhancement to a proposed
workflow design provided by BLINDED FOR REVIEW. The design
was composed of rapid acquisition, multimedia file extraction and
analysis, automated leads presentation, and safer presentation of
11 https://www.nist.gov/.
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explicit material. Over sixty-five percent (69 of 106) of all surveyed
participants evaluated the suggested workflow, with most re-
spondents finding some value in it. Specifically, most people
(44.93%) found the design valuable, 34.78% found it very valuable,
18.84% found it slightly to moderately valuable, while only one
respondent found no worth in it.
Only 42.45% (45 of 106) of those surveyed provided feedback
about the suggested design. Of that percentage, 35.56% suggested
improvements to the workflow, which are highlighted in Appendix
D, Table D.14. The majority of suggestions (61.11%) indicated tools
and technology as the main area for improvement. This included
providing encryption and file hiding analysis to discover steg-
anography attempts after rapid analysis, adding an explanation of
how the automated process generated its results to test for false
positives, and implementation of safer presentation at an earlier
stage.
Some responses (13.33%) involved criticism of the safety pre-
sentation feature, suggesting that safer presentation of CSAM was
not necessarily a concern. Some explained that CSAM still had to be
found by the examiner and verified by several people in the chain of
command. The prosecutor and jury, for example, are required to
view such material. Two other participants also claimed that
viewing CSAM was no longer an issue to them.
Additionally, 4.44% suggested that the automated leads pre-
sentation of the design is limited. This is because automation is not
plausible when physical evidence is encountered, thus, manual
analysis is still necessary. Additionally, automation can cause mis-
takes and miss evidence.
5.5. Tool processing times
5.5.1. Acquisition, processing, analysis, & reporting time
In this section, results from ten survey questions pertaining to
approximate tool processing times are discussed. The questions
focused on the estimated number of hours respondents’ current
tools may take when processing a complete case and as individual
phases of a forensic investigation, such as acquisition, analysis, and
report generation in a laboratory or on-scene setting. The case
provided consisted of two phones with 60,000 images and three
hours of video. Not all participants from the sample population
ðn ¼ 106Þ answered all questions, thus, results do not have the
same number of responses. Nevertheless, to provide a more accu-
rate comparison, outliers were removed from the overall results
and One-Sample T and ManneWhitney tests were conducted.
Respondents were asked to approximate the typical amount of
time it would take their current tool to process a CSAM case
(acquiring, analyzing and generating a report) in a laboratory
setting. They were also asked to suggest the preferred optimal
processing times for such tools in the same setting. Only 83.96% of
participants provided typical processing times, while 76.42% pro-
vided optimal times. Unsurprisingly, results indicate respondents
prefer a tool that is faster than their current one. The average
optimal time is 14.64 h ðSD ¼ 12:30Þwhich is slightly over six hours
less than the average typical time ðM ¼ 21:05; SD ¼ 15:01Þ. A One-
Sample T test was performed, assuming that the respondents
shared an accurate average time representative of the real world.
This reinforced the finding that the optimal time was statistically
significantly lower than the typical time, ðtð73Þ ¼ 4:485; p ¼ :000Þ.
An interesting observation worth mentioning is that there is an
enormous difference of 58.6 processing hours between the typical
minimum (2.5 h) and maximum (61.1 h) processing times. There-
fore, these results demonstrate how different investigator experi-
ences are when using tools.
Continuing with typical times for processing in a lab setting,
respondents were asked to estimate the number of hours their
current tool may take when individually acquiring, analyzing, and
creating an evidentiary report. Out of 106 participants, only 83.96%
provided an estimate number of hours their tool takes to accom-
plish acquisition, while 83.02% approximated analysis times and
80.19% estimated reporting times. Results demonstrate that the
average tool takes approximately over six more hours to analyze
ðM ¼ 17:80; SD ¼ 15:26Þ the evidence than acquiring
ðM ¼ 11:52; SD ¼ 10:94Þ the data, and over 11 h more than
creating a report ðM ¼ 5:94; SD ¼ 5:40Þ.
Respondents were also asked similar questions about process-
ing times within an on-scene or tactical setting. Approximately
69.81% of the sample population answered the question pertaining
to typical processing time, while (66.04%) answered the question
pertaining to optimal processing time. Results suggest respondents
prefer an optimal average processing time of 5.54 h ðSD ¼ 4:86Þ
when in the field. This ideal time is over six hours less than the
normal average time ðM ¼ 11:68; SD ¼ 10:62Þ. A One-Sample T
test ðtð58Þ ¼ 9:703; p ¼ :000Þ, suggested the optimal average time
is statistically significantly lower than the typical average time.
Lastly, while recognizing other factors involved in processing evi-
dence in the field, it is intriguing that the submitted typical mini-
mum amount of time was one hour, while the maximum (40.7 h) is
39.7 h longer.
Finally, respondents were asked to approximate the time their
current tool takes when individually acquiring, analyzing, and
creating an evidentiary report while working in the field. Fewer
participants answered these questions when compared to the lab
setting's feedback. In fact, 68.87% provided acquisition times,
62.26% presented reporting times, and 66.98% submitted analysis
times. Results demonstrate that on average, analyzing
ðM ¼ 7:74; SD ¼ 7:59Þ data on the field takes almost two hours
longer than acquiring ðM ¼ 6:01; SD ¼ 4:72Þ data and over two
hours longer than creating a report ðM ¼ 5:13; SD ¼ 5:63Þ.
While recognizing discrepancies in sample size feedback, all lab
and on-scene processing times were compared to approximate
which location may take the longest in completing investigative
tasks. A ManneWhitney test suggests that processing times in the
laboratory were statistically significantly higher than the on-scene
group ðU ¼ 1509; p ¼ :000Þ. It would take approximately over nine
hours more to process a complete case in the lab than on the field.
When comparing lab and on-scene processing times for indi-
vidual phases (acquiring, analyzing, and generating a report),
conducting them in the lab setting also takes the longest. This
conclusion was reached by conducting a ManneWhitney test and
comparing their averages. For instance, for the acquisition phase, a
ManneWhitney test suggests that the groups (lab and on-scene)
were significantly statistically different ðU ¼ 1783; p ¼ :001Þ,
taking over five hours more to acquire data in the lab than on the
field. Moreover, the analysis phase takes the longest time to
accomplish in both settings out of all phases. AManneWhitney test
ðU ¼ 1367; p ¼ :000Þ, shows that the lab analysis times were
statistically significantly higher than that of the field, taking over
ten hours more to analyze the data in the lab than on the field.
On the other hand, creating a report on the field and in a lab
setting takes almost the same average time. In fact, the difference is
less than an hour. A ManneWhitney test with a result of U ¼ 1937;
p ¼ :321, suggests that distribution of times across both groups is
similar. It is important to add that the lab setting group contained
fourteenmore responses than the on-scene setting, suggesting that
if both groups had the same number of responses, then creating a
report on the field may actually take longer than in the lab.
5.5.2. Acquisition processing times for android phones
Respondents were asked a series of six questions to estimate
tool acquisition processing times for Android phones with different
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storage capacities. Not all participants answered all questions, thus,
outliers were removed from the final calculations and a
ManneWhitney test was conducted to provide comparison of
statistics. Out of 106 respondents, 61.23% submitted acquisition
times pertaining to the 8 GB phone, 62.26% for the 16 GB and 64 GB
phones, 63.21% for the 32 GB phone, 60.38% for the 128 GB phone,
and 55.66% for 256 GB phone.
As expected, the higher the storage capacity of a phone, the
longer it would normally take for a tool to acquire an image.
Therefore, tests were conducted to compare each capacity against
the highest capacity (256 GB) to evaluate their differences. Calcu-
lations confirmed expectations that the averages and standard
deviations increased the higher the storage capacity. For example,
on average, it takes a 256 GB phone ðM ¼ 8:39; SD ¼ 6:71Þ, over six
more hours to acquire an image than an 8 GB phone ðM ¼ 2:17;
SD ¼ 2:04Þ. A ManneWhitney test ðU ¼ 394; p ¼ :000Þ, shows
that both groups are statistically significantly different, with the
256 GB phone producing higher acquisition times.
Calculations performed on the rest of the storage capacities
resulted in the following: 16 GB ðM ¼ 3:24; SD ¼ 2:87Þ, ðU ¼ 654;
p ¼ :000Þ; 32 GB ðM ¼ 4:33; SD ¼ 3:63Þ, ðU ¼ 867; p ¼ :000Þ; and
64 GB ðM ¼ 5:62; SD ¼ 5:14Þ, ðU ¼ 1072; p ¼ :002Þ. This shows
that all groups are statistically significantly different when
compared against the 256 GB phone. Comparison of the 128 GB
phone ðM ¼ 6:70; SD ¼ 5:65Þ, ðU ¼ 1265; p ¼ :108Þ resulted in a
similar distribution group, suggesting that there is not much of a
difference in acquisition times between the 128 GB and 256 GB,
even though one has twice the capacity.
6. Limitations
The number of participants responding to questions was not the
same across the board. This was due in part to intentional skipping
of questions and early drop-out rates. This resulted in questions
having varying response counts. Additionally, wording may have
caused some questions to be misinterpreted by participants. As a
result, several non-related answers were provided by respondents.
Furthermore, an observation was made that some respondents
were not consistent in their answers. For example, there is a dif-
ference in the number of people who selected “I do not use tools”
when asked about the tools they use to process images and videos
and the number of people who selected “I do not use tools” when
asked what technologies were implemented by their tools. To
address these concerns data cleansing was performed.
7. Discussion/conclusion
The results of this study demonstrated a few things, many of
which were already known. Among them is the issue of de-
mographic diversity. The majority of participants were older white
males, a population that dominates the field. Additionally, partici-
pants generally had six years of experience and, aside from a few,
an educational background not related to law, forensics, or security.
Regardless of a relating educational background, most participants
work at the local or state level as a digital forensic examiner or
investigator.
The minimal level or lack of knowledge in Data Science is
interesting given the amount of data encountered by practitioners.
Practitioners should feel comfortable in their ability to obtain,
process, and extract value from data acquired in an investigation.
This may not only help in the investigation itself, but in resolving
issues faced by practitioners, such as the inefficiency of some tools
or processes. Skill development in this area would allow practi-
tioners to contribute more to improving areas of concern.
On the job, examiners and investigators use a variety of tools,
predominately commercial, to process images and videos. Most
utilize more than one tool, each to target a specific need. Of the
technology implemented by tools, filtering technologies appear to
be the most useful and important to participants. While partici-
pants acknowledged that, if available, they would use safe-viewing
technologies, these were not as important to them as filtering
technologies. As many participants explained, they feel it is
essential to the job to look at and confirm the results of processing;
they feel they need to look at the explicit content. However, for
some it may be beneficial in terms of their concerns regarding
endurance and how it may limit their work. As one participant said,
“an examiner can only look at so much child pornography at a
time.”
In terms of limitations, common trends were found among re-
sponses. For tools, the main concerns are speed, accuracy, and
reporting, which ultimately affect workflow and the speed of an
investigation. Many respondents provided their own insight for an
improved workflow to increase efficiency in a investigation. Ulti-
mately, the sentiment across the field was that an improved
workflow would require adequate funding, personnel, and time.
Finally, in hindsight, the researchers acknowledge that certain
follow-up questions would have been beneficial. For example,
those that indicated that they did not use any type of tools or
technology could have been asked why tools or technology are not
being used and what their work process entails. Such a question
would have provided additional, and differing, insight regarding
the topic at hand.
8. Recommendations
Our interaction with practitioners yielded actionable recom-
mendations. Based on the analysis of the survey results and
augmented by our interviews with practitioners, the following
recommendations should be considered in the area of CSAM
investigations:
 Incorporating courses on AI, software design, engineering, and
data science into digital forensic programs to provide under-
standing of low-level concepts in data science.
 Establishing a continuous funding model to support research in
CSAM investigations.
 Encouraging the development and use of open source tools
focused on CSAM forensics by increasing “confidence in the
tools through publication, review, and formal testing,” (Carrier,
2002).
 Establishing and implementing an up-to-date, standardized
workflow, allowing for quicker investigations while minimizing
the exposure of practitioners to CSAM.
 Encouraging non-practitioners, such as upper management, to
engage in training for developing comprehensive knowledge of
the work entailed in such investigations, and of the resources
needed.
 Achieving accurate CSAM identification without the use of hash
values by implementing state of the art AI techniques.
 Focusing research on the age estimation problem, especially for
adolescents. This will help develop more accurate AI models for
CSAM identification.
 Developing technology that can detect and cluster victim faces
and apply age estimation techniques. The current state of the art
open source models are not effective in this domain.
 Employing novel filtering techniques beyond the widely adop-
ted skin tone detection. Practitioners noted that skin tone
detection was not effective when examining large collections of
CSAM.
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 Leveraging novel techniques, such as object detection, to pro-
vide leads, allowing investigators to quickly identify locations,
suspects, and victims in CSAM.
 Developing technologies that would allow tools to automatically
upload newly identified CSAM to a centrally shared repository
between authorities whilst adhering to legal standards.
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Appendix A. Demographics
Table A.1
Demographics. *Any percentage disparities due to rounding.
Count Percentage
Race
Asian 3 2.83%
White 99 93.40%
Other 4 3.77%
e Human
Sex
Female 14 13.21%
Male 92 86.79%
Age
21e34 20 18.87%
35e44 38 35.85%
45e54 31 29.25%
55e64 17 16.03%
Level of Education
High school diploma or equivalent 1 0.94%
Some college 17 16.04%
Associate's degree 22 20.75%
Bachelor's degree 44 41.51%
Master's degree 21 19.81%
Doctorate 1 0.94%
Employment Category
Federal government employee 12 12.00%
State government employee 32 32.00%
Local government employee (city, county, etc.) 46 46.00%
Private, for profit 5 5.00%
Private, non-profit 1 1.00%
Contractor 2 2.00%
Other 2 2.00%
Occupation
Digital Forensic Examiner 93 69.92%
Investigator 35 26.32%
Prosecutor 1 0.75%
Researcher 2 1.50%
Other 2 1.50%
e Cyber Security Professional
e Manager - was investigator and digital forensics examiner (DFE)
Time of experience working on CSAM cases
Less than one year 5 5.00%
1e2 years 11 11.00%
3e4 years 13 13.00%
5e6 years 8 8.00%
More than 6 years 63 63.00%
Table A.2
Professional degrees amongst respondents. *Any percentage disparities due to
rounding.
Degree Count Percentage
Accounting 1 1.14%
Agricultural Business Management 1 1.14%
Biology 1 1.14%
Business Administration and Management 4 4.54%
Computer Science 12 13.64%
Crime, Law, and Justice 25 28.40%
Cybersecurity 1 1.14%
Digital Forensics 15 17.04%
English 2 2.27%
Food Science 1 1.14%
Forensic Science 3 3.41%
General Science 1 1.14%
Geography 1 1.14%
Health and Physical Education 1 1.14%
Information Sciences and Technology 4 4.54%
Law Enforcement and Correction 7 7.95%
Political Science 2 2.27%
Psychology 1 1.14%
Sociology 3 3.41%
Other 2 2.27%
e Automotive Technology
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Fig. A.4. Technical fields respondents are competent at. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
Table A.3
Locations where respondents received training in investigating CSAM.
Type Location Count Total Count Percentage
Academic Institutions Dixie State University 1 14 7.95%
Fox Valley Technical College (FVTC) 6
Purdue University 2
SANS Institute 2
University College Dublin 2
University of New Hampshire 1
Children's Advocacy Centers (CAC) Alabama (did not specify exact center) 1 5 2.84%
Center for Child Protection, Austin 1
Childrens Hospital of Wisconsin 1
Dallas Children's Advocacy Center 2
Forensic tool training Access Data 4 25 14.20%
Berla 1
BlackLight 1
Cellebrite 4
Forensic Toolkit 1
Guidance Software/EnCase 7
ICACCOPS 1
Magnet Forensics 2
GridCop 1
WetStone Technologies 1
Did not specify 2
Government Funded Programs Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) 22 50 28.41%
National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) 23
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) 5
In office training or on-the-job experience In-office 2 7 3.98%
On-the-job experience 5
Law enforcement/Police academy Indiana Law Enforcement Academy 1 7 3.98%
Maui Police Department Training Academy 1
The Police University College, Finland 1
Politieacademie, Netherlands 1
South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy 1
U.S. Air Force Special Investigations Academy (USAFSIA) 1
Did not specify 1
Local Law Enforcement Harris County Sheriff's Office, Child Abuse Unit 1 2 1.14%
Montgomery County Maryland Police Department 1
Non-Profit Organizations ChildFirst Forensic Interviewing Protocol 1 16 9.09%
European Cybercrime Training and Education Group (ECTEG) 1
Florida Childrens Services Council (CSC) 1
The Innocent Justice Foundation (TIJF) 1
The International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) 12
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Appendix B. Tools
Table A.4
Locations where respondents received training in investigating CSAM - continued.
Type Location Count Total Count Percentage
Private Organizations/Companies Backbone Security 1 5 2.84%
National Coalition of Advanced Technology Centers (NCATC) 1
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 1
Teel Technologies 2
State Bureau of Investigation Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation 1 2 1.14%
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 1
State Level Department of Justice (DOJ) Wisconsin 3 4 2.27%
California 1
State Police Arkansas 1 3 1.70%
Indiana 1
West Virginia 1
State Programs Child Abuse Training and Coordination Program (CATC), Oklahoma 1 1 0.57%
U.S. Department of Defense Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy (DCITA) 2 2 1.14%
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) 4 12 6.82%
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 1
Secret Service (including NCFI- National Computer Forensics Institute) 7
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 4 10 5.68%
National Domestic Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC) 1
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) 2
Did not specify 3
Other Attorney General's Office, South Carolina 1 4 2.27%
Child Symposium, San Diego (did not specify conference or workshop) 1
Prosecutor's Office 2
Unknown Did not specify training 7 7 3.98%
Table B.5
Image Processing Tools.
Count Percentage
Image Processing Tools Utilized by Practitioners
Analyze 16.1/Griffeye 54 10.07%
Autopsy 21 3.92%
Cellebrite Analytics 23 4.29%
Cellebrite UFED/PA 88 16.42%
Computer Aided Investigative Environment (CAINE) 6 1.12%
Digital Forensics Framework (DFF) 1 0.19%
EnCase Forensic 59 11.01%
EnCase Mobile Investigator 8 1.49%
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) 64 11.94%
Magnet Forensics IEF/Axiom 87 16.23%
NuDetective 1 0.19%
Oxygen Forensics Analyst 10 1.87%
Oxygen Forensics Detective 10 1.87%
Paraben E3: DS 1 0.19%
Paraben E3: Universal 1 0.19%
PhotoDNA 21 3.92%
PlainSight 1 0.19%
The Sleuth Kit 11 2.05%
VizX2/ZiuZ 1 0.19%
X-Ways Forensics 45 8.40%
Other 22 4.10%
e AccessData Lab
e ADF Examiner
e Blacklight
e FastScan
e FieldView
e Forensic Explorer
e ForensicScan
e GrayKey
e Lantern
e Macquisition
e Mobilyze
e NetAnalysis
e Nuix
e Octoplus
e Paladin
e Paladin Recon
Table B.5 (continued )
e Secure View
e Spada
e XRY
e Did not specify
I do not use tools to process images 1 0.19%
Table B.6
Video Processing Tools.
Count Percentage
Video Processing Tools Utilized by Practitioners
Analyze 16.1/Griffeye 52 11.79%
Autopsy 11 2.49%
Cellebrite Analytics 16 3.63%
Cellebrite UFED/PA 74 16.78%
Computer Aided Investigative Environment (CAINE) 3 0.68%
Digital Forensics Framework (DFF) 2 0.45%
EnCase Forensic 50 11.34%
EnCase Mobile Investigator 6 1.36%
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) 56 12.70%
Magnet Forensics IEF/Axiom 78 17.69%
Oxygen Forensics Analyst 8 1.81%
Oxygen Forensics Detective 8 1.81%
Paraben E3: DS 1 0.23%
Paraben E3: Universal 1 0.23%
PhotoDNA 13 2.95%
PlainSight 1 0.23%
The Sleuth Kit 7 1.59%
VizX2/ZiuZ 1 0.23%
X-Ways Forensics 35 7.94%
Other 16 3.63%
e AccessData Lab
e ADF Examiner
e Blacklight
e Forensic Explorer
e GrayKey
e Paladin Recon
e PhotoRec
e VLC
e XRY
e Did not specify
I do not use tools to process videos 2 0.45%
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Table B.7
Tool Limitations.
Type Limitation Count Total Count Percentage
Features/Capabilities Time-consuming 6 29 61.70%
Cannot automatically group together several images of the same victim 1
Cannot carve images 1
Lacks obfuscation detection 1
Lacks ability to enhance poor quality photos 1
Lacks built-in definitions and clarity 1
Lacks customizable report format 1
Does not create reports that a court and jury could easily understand 1
Tools are not comprehensive 1
Compatibility and integration with other tools 1
Missing software components 1
Outdated software and features 1
Accuracy Accuracy of filtering features 4 11 23.40%
Receiving false positives 4
Manual validation of results 2
Tool functioning 1
User-Friendliness Graphical user interface 2 3 6.40%
Overly complicated to use 1
Other No limitations 3 4 8.50%
Cost of tools 1
Table B.8
Yahoo NSFW and iCOP/iCAC COP Results.
Count Percentage
Use of Yahoo NSFW and iCOP/iCAC COP
Those that have used or currently use the Yahoo NSFW Image Classification Model 2 2.56%
Those that have used or currently use iCOP/iCAC COP 39 50.00%
Those that have used or currently use both Yahoo NSFW and iCOP/iCAC COP 1 1.28%
Those that have not used either Yahoo NSFW or iCOP/iCAC COP 36 46.15%
Benefits of Using Yahoo NSFW and iCOP/iCAC COP
Quickness 11 22.92%
Identifying the presence of explicit content featuring children at a location or with a subject and monitoring P2P networks 10 20.83%
Saving time 7 14.58%
Filtering/filtering options to narrow down data 6 12.50%
Searching for known content (via hash values) 5 10.42%
Exam thoroughness 2 4.17%
Eliminating false positives/accuracy 2 4.17%
Receiving tips/leads 1 2.08%
Undercover case deconfliction 1 2.08%
Target investigative efforts 1 2.08%
Improving efficiency 1 2.08%
Automated reporting 1 2.08%
Limitations of Using Yahoo NSFW and iCOP/iCAC COP
Only known files can be identified/detected 7 25.00%
Can throw off hash-value comparison with file alteration 3 10.71%
False positives 2 7.14%
Validation of data is still necessary 2 7.14%
Indiscriminate use of and trust in tools 2 7.14%
Cumbersome when dealing with large amounts of data 1 3.57%
Poor image quality 1 3.57%
Available geolocation tools 1 3.57%
Subject can hide their location 1 3.57%
Ability to obtain downloads from suspect IP can be affected by different variables 1 3.57%
Limited resources and training 1 3.57%
Large case loads 1 3.57%
Variation in child pornography laws 1 3.57%
No limitations/limitations are not the result of tools 3 10.71%
Not sure 1 3.57%
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Appendix C. Technology
Table C.9
Technologies.
Count Percentage
Technology Implemented by Image Processing Tools
Skin Tone Detection 76 56.30%
Face Recognition 6 4.44%
Face Detection 16 11.85%
Age Estimation 1 0.74%
Gender Estimation 1 0.74%
Child Nudity Detection 8 5.93%
Object Detection 5 3.70%
Face Presentation 1 0.74%
Nudity Blocker 3 2.22%
None of the above 13 963%
I do not use tools 5 3.70%
Technology Implemented by Video Processing Tools
Skin Tone Detection 80 56.34%
Face Recognition 6 4.23%
Face Detection 16 11.27%
Gender Estimation 1 0.70%
Child Nudity Detection 10 7.04%
Object Detection 8 5.63%
Face Presentation 1 0.70%
Nudity Blocker 3 2.11%
None of the above 13 9.15%
I do not use tools 4 2.82%
Technology Utilized by Respondents to Process Images
Skin Tone Detection 67 52.34%
Face Recognition 7 5.47%
Face Detection 10 7.81%
Age Estimation 1 0.78%
Gender Estimation 1 0.78%
Child Nudity Detection 5 3.91%
Object Detection 6 4.69%
Face Presentation 1 0.78%
Nudity Blocker 3 2.34%
None of the options provided 16 12.50%
I do not use any technologies 11 8.59%
Technology Utilized by Respondents to Process Videos
Skin Tone Detection 57 46.34%
Face Recognition 5 4.07%
Face Detection 9 7.32%
Age Estimation 1 0.81%
Gender Estimation 1 0.81%
Child Nudity Detection 6 4.88%
Object Detection 6 4.88%
Nudity Blocker 2 1.63%
None of the options provided 25 20.33%
I do not use any technologies 11 8.94%
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Fig. C.5. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
Fig. C.6. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
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Fig. C.7. Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
Fig. C.8. Each bar represents Likert scale options for the question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each option.
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Appendix D. Workflow
Table C.10
Expected v. Optimal Rates of False Positives.
Expected Rate of False Positives Optimal Rate of False Positives
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Skin Tone Detection 60 25.01 20.35 15.62 52 15.68 12.55 13.23
Face Recognition 46 18.58 19.20 11.79 52 13.50 10.00 12.65
Face Detection 48 14.47 10.15 11.44 52 13.00 10.15 11.69
Age Estimation 44 27.84 25.75 14.74 52 14.47 10.45 13.20
Gender Estimation 42 18.96 16.20 14.22 52 14.57 9.95 13.91
Pose Estimation 42 19.60 17.90 13.98 52 15.08 11.60 13.40
Child Nudity Detection 45 23.82 20.40 14.85 52 13.63 9.80 13.33
Object Detection 41 19.62 19.00 13.80 52 13.23 9.95 12.45
Least Explicit Frame 41 18.39 17.70 13.65 52 13.06 10.00 12.42
Face Presentation 41 13.71 10.00 12.67 52 13.29 9.85 12.74
Nudity Blocker 41 17.61 15.00 13.68 52 13.16 9.85 12.39
Selective Body Part Viewing 40 19.11 18.4 14.52 52 14.23 10.00 13.55
Neural Net Detection Tag Presentation 40 19.91 18.4 14.27 52 14.35 10.00 13.52
Table C.11
Expected v. Optimal Rates of False Negatives.
Expected Rate of False Negatives Optimal Rate of False Negatives
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Skin Tone Detection 58 22.09 20.15 13.51 47 11.21 9.90 10.65
Face Recognition 58 18.88 19.40 12.73 47 10.89 9.10 10.40
Face Detection 58 16.74 14.65 11.49 47 10.52 5.70 10.29
Age Estimation 58 22.99 20.50 14.86 47 11.17 6.70 11.12
Gender Estimation 58 18.36 16.85 13.35 47 11.88 9.20 11.93
Pose Estimation 58 17.41 15.75 12.03 47 12.58 9.40 12.21
Child Nudity Detection 58 19.94 18.70 12.78 47 10.40 6.10 11.02
Object Detection 58 14.67 14.20 10.11 47 11.06 8.40 10.44
Least Explicit Frame 58 16.45 15.20 12.43 47 10.53 5.10 11.40
Face Presentation 58 14.76 10.80 11.99 47 10.75 6.40 11.79
Nudity Blocker 58 17.35 14.25 13.46 47 11.02 9.20 10.42
Selective Body Part Viewing 58 18.08 18.55 12.71 47 9.95 5.50 10.60
Neural Net Detection Tag Presentation 58 18.39 18.75 12.82 47 10.98 7.40 10.95
Table D.12
Current workflow limitations for investigating CSAM cases.
Type Limitation Count Total Count Percentage
Anti-Forensics Encryption 1 2 2.73%
File concealing applications 1
Hardware Compatibility 1 3 4.11%
Computer speed 1
Storage 1
Mental Health Endurance 2 3 4.11%
Stability 1
Resources Agency support 1 8 10.96%
Funds for modern software/hardware 2
Personnel/examiners/investigators 4
Resources in general 1
Time Processing evidence 4 13 17.81%
Return time of subpoenas, search warrants, and court orders/results 2
Time in general 7
Tools andTechnology Categorization & presentation of images in final report 1 21 28.77%
Cloud storage 1
Detecting images 1
Efficient sorting through thousands of images 1
Hash filtering (NIST, etc) 4
Identifying ages of children 1
Not enough filtering mechanisms (images/videos/unrelated artifacts) 3
Outdated software/tools 1
Preview of videos 1
Processing images/videos 1
Restricted to validated tools only 1
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Table D.12 (continued )
Type Limitation Count Total Count Percentage
Skin tone detection 1
Speed (acquisition/analysis) 2
Tool Integration 2
Workload Amount of data to review 6 15 20.55%
Backlogs 2
Case Prioritization (Triaging) 1
Large caseload 4
Number of devices 2
Other Communicating with other investigators 1 8 10.96%
Inaccurate leads from cyber tips 1
Lack of guidance and training on Project VIC 1
Presentation to court 1
Proper search authority 1
Shipping case materials 1
Speed 1
Travel 1
Table D.13
Improvements to current workflow for investigating CSAM cases. *Any percentage disparities due to rounding.
Type Suggestion Count Total Count Percentage
Management/Standards Administrative stress reduction 1 8 9.64%
Better information from case agents 1
Better polices and procedures regarding prioritization 1
Digital forensics education/training for management 1
Fewer interruptions 1
Have supervisor verify evidence as CSAM 1
Meet and communicate with prosecutor/lawyer to determine counts to prosecute 2
Reports Better method to formulate report and definitions for court and jury 1 2 2.41%
Replace general standardized reports with content-specific reports 1
Resources Analysts/examiners/investigators 13 30 36.14%
More and better hardware/equipment 6
More and better software/tools 6
More funds 3
More resources in general 1
Training 1
Time More time in general 1 5 6.02%
Speed processing times (tools/equipment) 4
Tools & Technology Ability to eliminate redundant images/videos found across multiple devices during analysis 1 28 33.73%
Accessibility to and ease of use of hash value repositories via forensic tools 1
Allow for customizable and user friendly report generation 1
Allow seamless reporting between investigative applications 1
Automatic age recognition 2
Create standard format for cross-platform use 1
Improve accuracy of tools depicting online peer to peer activity 1
Improve filtering mechanisms (images/videos/unrelated artifacts) 9
Improving filtering options 3
Improve speed of media imaging 1
Improve speeds of recovering deleted content 1
Incorporate a tool for bypassing pass codes on Android mobile devices 1
Incorporate and utilize TensorFlow as a plugin for digital forensic tools 1
Provide link analysis (e.g., metadata report for all images) 1
Task automatization 2
Tools to sanitize reports/images for review by non-forensic personnel 1
Other Better training and distribution of Project VIC 1 10 12.05%
Better training for cloud based investigations 1
Compel passwords for all devices and encryption 1
Improve inter-organizational collaboration in regards to timelines and expectations 1
Improve use of hash sets 1
Make it feasible for investigators nationwide to share hash values of CSAM 1
More hash databases of explicit content featuring children 1
Speed (processing, etc.) 2
Stay up to date with industry standards 1
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Table D.14
Improvements to given suggested workflow for investigating CSAM cases.
Type Suggestion Count Total Count Percentage
Resources More analysts/examiners/investigators 2 3 16.67%
More computers 1
Time Limit work hours of exposure to CSAM 1 1 5.56%
Tools & Technology Ability to process large datasets faster 1 11 61.11%
Add explanation of how automated process generated its result to check for false positives 1
Add report options 1
After rapid analysis, provide encryption and file hiding analysis to discover steganography attempts 1
Assign priority levels to cases based on known presence of CSAM 1
Automatically categorize and extract the content of any device (hard drive, usb key, etc.) 1
Faster acquisition and analysis 1
Implement safer presentation at an earlier stage 1
Quickly generate a report 1
Retain explicit format and safe presentation 1
Utilize reporting software with efficient filters to manually input the data necessary for a case 1
Other Availability of an expert witness to testify on behalf of the tool 1 3 16.67%
System/workflow should allow for division of work into manageable tasks and collaborative/multi-user effort 1
Workflow should address data storage, network security, data retention and disposal, granular access and audit trail 1
L. Sanchez et al. / Digital Investigation 29 (2019) S124eS142S142
